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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing performance and behavior of 
market advisory services in corn and soybeans.  Data on corn and soybean net price received for 
advisory services, as reported by the AgMAS Project, are available for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 
marketing years.  Performance test results suggest that, on average, market advisory services 
exhibit a small ability to "beat the market".  This conclusion is somewhat sensitive to the type of 
performance test and market benchmark considered.  The predictability results provide little 
evidence that future advisory service pricing performance can be predicted from past 
performance.  Marketing profiles identify three marketing “styles”:  i) “scale-up” sales, ii) 
selective hedging and iii) “speculative” hedging.  Advisory services tend to follow the same 
approach across crop years.     2 
The Private Sector Approach to Grain Marketing: The Case of  
Agricultural Market Advisory Services 
 
 
In the wake of the FAIR Act of 1996, there has been a great deal of discussion in 
agriculture about the need for greater attention to grain marketing and risk management.  
Comments from a panel of farm managers (Johnston and Schertz, 1998) are representative: 
 
Greater adjustment of acreage and increased price volatility leads to a need for more 
attention to marketing. 
 
Farmers must concentrate on marketing for a huge part of their business if they plan to 
stay in business. 
 
Producers and land owners need to be focused on marketing.  Marketing is much more 
critical to success in farming than ever before. 
 
Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that the private-sector will play a more important 
role in grain marketing and risk management.   
  Market advisory services represent an important source of private-sector grain marketing 
information and advice for farmers in the post-FAIR world.  Surveys document the popularity of 
these services among farmers. For example, Patrick, Musser, and Eckman (1998) indicate that 35 
and 38 percent of large-scale, midwestern grain farmers used marketing consultants in 1993 and 
1994, respectively.  Schroeder, Parcell, Kastens and Dhuyvetter (1998) survey Kansas crop 
farmers and report that market advisory services and newsletters are the highest ranked source of 
information used to formulate price expectations.  It is interesting to note that farmers rank 
advisory services even higher than futures markets in this survey. 
  Given the important role that market advisory services play in grain marketing and risk 
management, it is somewhat surprising that only two previous academic studies investigate the 
performance of advisory services (Gehrt and Good, 1993; Martines-Filho, 1996).  Both studies   3 
generally find that corn and soybean farmers obtain a higher price by following the marketing 
recommendations of advisory services. While a useful starting point, these two studies have 
important limitations.  First, the sample of advisory services is quite small, with the largest 
sample including only six advisory services.  Second, the results may be biased due to the nature 
of the sample selection process.  The literature on the performance of mutual funds and 
investment newsletters highlights the sample selection biases that plague many performance 
results (e.g. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross, 1992; Jaffe and Mahoney, 1999; Metrick, 
1999).  The most relevant bias for previous studies of market advisory services is survivorship 
bias, which results from tracking only advisory services that remain in business at the end of a 
sample period.  
  The previous discussion suggests the academic literature provides little basis for 
evaluating the performance and behavior of market advisory services.  In 1994, the Agricultural 
Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project was initiated, with the goal of providing unbiased 
and rigorous evaluation of market advisory services for farmers.  Since its inception, the AgMAS 
Project has collected marketing recommendations for about 25 market advisory programs.  The 
AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed, and as a result, "real-time" 
recommendations are obtained.  This prevents the data from being subject to survivorship bias.   
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing performance and behavior of 
market advisory services in corn and soybeans.  Market advisory service recommendations for 
corn and soybeans are available from the AgMAS Project for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 marketing 
years.  At least 21 advisory services are included for each commodity and marketing year.  The 
first issue investigated is whether market advisory services, on average, outperform an 
appropriate market benchmark. Tests of performance relative to a benchmark are based on the   4 
proportion of services exceeding the benchmark price and the average percentage difference 
between the net price of services and the benchmark price.  The second issue analyzed is whether 
market advisory services exhibit predictability in their performance from year-to-year.  Tests of 
predictability are based on the year-to-year correlation of advisory service ranks, prices and 
percentage differences from the benchmark. The third and final issue investigated is the 
marketing behavior of advisory services.  A daily index of the net amount sold for a 
representative set of market advisory programs is used to illustrate different categories of market 
advisory service behavior. When the daily values of the index are plotted for the entire marketing 
period, the marketing "profile" for a program is generated.  
     
Data on Advisory Service Recommendations 
The market advisory services included in this study do not comprise the population of 
market advisory services available to farmers.  The included services also are not a random 
sample of the population of market advisory services.  Neither approach is feasible because no 
public agency or trade group assembles a list of advisory services that could be considered the 
"population."  Furthermore, there is not a generally agreed upon definition of an agricultural 
market advisory service.  To assemble a sample of services for the AgMAS Project, criteria are 
developed to define an agricultural market advisory service and a list of services is assembled. 
The first criterion used to identify services is that a service has to provide marketing 
advice to farmers. Some of the services tracked by the AgMAS Project do provide speculative 
trading advice, but that advice must be clearly differentiated from marketing advice to farmers 
for the service to be included.  The terms "speculative" trading of futures and options versus the 
use of futures and options for "hedging" purposes are used for identification purposes only.  A   5 
discussion of what types of futures and options trading activities constitute hedging, as opposed 
to speculating, is not considered. 
The second criterion is that specific advice must be given for making cash sales of the 
commodity, in addition to any futures or options hedging activities.  In fact, some marketing 
programs evaluated by the AgMAS Project do not make any futures and options 
recommendations.  However, marketing programs that make futures and options hedging 
recommendations, but fail to clearly state when cash sales should be made, or the amount to be 
sold, are not considered. 
  The original sample of market advisory services that met the two criteria were drawn 
from the list of  "Premium Services" available from the two major agricultural satellite networks, 
Data Transmission Network (DTN) and FarmDayta in the summer of 1994.
1, 2  While the list of 
advisory services available from these networks was by no means exhaustive, it did have the 
considerable merit of meeting a market test.  Presumably, the services offered by the networks 
were those most in demand by farm subscribers to the networks.  In addition, the list of available 
services was cross-checked with other farm publications to confirm that widely-followed 
advisory firms were included in the sample.  It seems reasonable to argue that the resulting 
sample of services was (and remains) generally representative of the majority of advisory 
services available to farmers. 
  The original sample for 1995 includes 25 market advisory programs for both corn and 
soybeans.  For a variety of reasons, deletions and additions to the original sample occur over 
time.  In 1996, the total number of advisory programs is 26 for corn and 24 for soybeans, while 
in 1997 the total is 23 for corn and 21 for soybeans.  The term “advisory program” is used 
because several advisory services have more than one distinct marketing program.  A directory   6 
of the advisory services included in the study can be found at the AgMAS Project website 
(http://www.aces.uiuc.edu/~agmas/). 
  As mentioned earlier, sample selection biases may plague advisory service databases.  
The first form is survival bias, which occurs if only advisory services that remain in business at 
the end of a given period are included in the sample.  Survival bias significantly biases measures 
of performance upwards since "survivors" typically have higher performance than "non-
survivors" (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross, 1992).  This form of bias should not be 
present in the AgMAS database of advisory services because all services ever tracked are 
included in the sample.  The second and more subtle form of bias is hindsight bias, which occurs 
if data from prior periods are "back-filled" at the point in time when an advisory service is added 
to the database.  Statistically, this has the same effect as survivorship bias because data from 
surviving advisory services is back-filled.  This form of bias should not be present in the 
AgMAS database because recommendations are not back-filled when an advisory service is 
added.  Instead, recommendations are collected only for the marketing year after a decision has 
been made to add an advisory service to the database. 
The actual daily process of collecting recommendations for the sample of advisory 
services begins with the purchase of subscriptions to each of the services.  Staff members of the 
AgMAS Project read the information provided by each advisory service on a daily basis.  The 
information is received electronically, via DTN, web sites or email.  For the services that provide 
two daily updates, typically in the morning and at noon, information is read in the morning and 
afternoon.  In this way, the actions of a farmer-subscriber are simulated in “real-time.” 
The recommendations of each advisory service are recorded separately.  Some advisory 
services offer two or more distinct marketing programs.  This typically takes the form of one set   7 
of advice for marketers who are willing to use futures and options (although futures and options 
are not always used), and a separate set of advice for farmers who only wish to make cash sales.
3  
In this situation, both strategies are recorded and treated as distinct strategies to be evaluated.
4  
Several procedures are used to check the recorded recommendations for accuracy and 
completeness.  Whenever possible, recorded recommendations are cross-checked against later 
status reports provided by the relevant advisory service.  Also, at the completion of the 
marketing year, it is confirmed whether cash sales total exactly 100 percent, all futures positions 
are offset, and all options positions are offset or expire worthless. 
 
Calculation of Net Advisory Service Prices 
At the end of each marketing year, all of the (filled) recommendations are aligned in 
chronological order.  The advice for a given marketing year is considered to be complete for 
each advisory program when cumulative cash sales of the commodity reach 100 percent, all open 
futures positions covering the crop are offset, all open option positions covering the crop are 
either offset or expired, and the advisory program discontinues giving advice for that crop year.  
The returns to each recommendation are then calculated in order to arrive at a weighted-average 
net price that would be received by a producer who precisely follows the marketing advice (as 
recorded by the AgMAS Project). 
In order to simulate a consistent and comparable set of results across the different 
advisory services, certain explicit assumptions are made.  These assumptions are intended to 
accurately depict marketing conditions for a representative, central-Illinois farm.  An overview 
of the simulation assumptions is presented below.  Complete details of the simulation 
assumptions can be found in Jackson, Irwin and Good (1999).   8 
A two-year marketing window, spanning September of the year before harvest through 
August of the year after harvest, is used in the analysis.  For example, the 1997 marketing 
window is September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1998.  The beginning date is selected because 
advisory services in the sample generally begin to make marketing recommendations around this 
date.  The ending date is selected to be consistent with the ending date for corn and soybean 
marketing years as defined by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA).  There are a few 
exceptions to the marketing window definition.  Several advisory programs have relatively small 
amounts (10 percent or less) of cash corn or soybeans unsold as of the end of a window.  One 
marketing program also began pre-harvest hedges prior to September 1, 1996.  In these cases, the 
actual sales recommendations on the indicated dates are recorded. 
The cash price assigned to each cash sale recommendation is the central-Illinois closing, 
or overnight, bid.  The central-Illinois price is the mid-point of the range of bids by elevators in a 
25-county area in central and east central-Illinois.  The bids are collected and reported by the 
Illinois Department of Ag Market News.  The central-Illinois market also is used for cash-
forward contract transactions.  Futures prices and options premia are Chicago Board of Trade 
quotes. 
Since most of the advisory program recommendations are given in terms of the 
proportion of total production (e.g., “sell 5 percent of 1997 crop today”), some assumption must 
be made about the amount of production to be marketed.  For the purposes of this study, if the 
per-acre yield is assumed to be 100 bushels, then a recommendation to sell 5 percent of the corn 
crop translates into selling 5 bushels.  When all of the advice for the marketing year has been 
carried out, the final per-bushel selling price is the average price for each transaction weighted 
by the amount marketed in each transaction.   9 
When making hedging or forward contracting decisions prior to harvest, the actual yield 
is unknown.  Hence, an assumption regarding the amount of expected production per acre is 
necessary to accurately reflect the returns to marketing advice.  Prior to harvest, the best estimate 
of the current year’s expected yield is a function of yield in previous years.  In this study, the 
assumed yield prior to harvest is based on a linear regression trend yield, while the actual 
reported yield is used from the harvest period forward. 
Brokerage costs are incurred when farmers open or lift positions in futures and options 
markets.  For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that brokerage costs are $50 per contract 
for a round-turn for futures transactions, and $30 per contract to enter or exit an options position.  
Further, it is assumed that CBOT corn and soybean futures are used, and the contract size for 
each commodity is 5,000 bushels.  Therefore, per-bushel brokerage costs are 1 cent per bushel 
for a round-turn futures transaction and 0.6 cents per bushel for each options transaction. 
An important element in assessing returns to an advisory program is the economic cost 
associated with storing grain instead of selling grain immediately at harvest.  The cost of storing 
grain after harvest (carrying costs) consists of two components: physical storage charges and the 
opportunity cost incurred by foregoing sales when the crop is harvested.  Physical storage 
charges can apply to off-farm (commercial) storage, on-farm storage, or some combination of the 
two.  Opportunity cost is the same regardless of the type of physical storage. 
For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that all storage occurs off-farm at 
commercial sites.  Carrying costs are assigned beginning at the end of harvest.  Physical storage 
charges are assumed to be a flat 13 cents per bushel from the end of harvest through December 
31.  After January 1, physical storage charges are assumed to be 2 cents per month (per bushel),   10 
with this charge pro-rated to the day when the cash sale is made.  The storage costs represent the 
typical storage charges quoted in a non-random telephone survey of central-Illinois elevators. 
The interest charge for storing grain is the interest rate compounded daily from the 
harvest mid-point to the date of sale.  The interest rate used is the average rate for all commercial 
agricultural loans for the fourth quarter of the harvest year and the first three quarters of the next 
calendar year as reported in the Agricultural Finance Databook published by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.  This interest rate has been around 9 percent per year 
for the three years of this study. 
In addition to the storage and interest costs, another charge is assigned to corn (but not 
soybeans).  This charge, referred to as a “shrink charge”, is commonly deducted by commercial 
elevators on “dry” corn that is delivered to the elevator to be stored, and reflects a charge for 
drying and volume reduction (shrinkage) which occurs in drying the corn from (typically) 15 
percent to 14 percent moisture.  The charge for drying is a flat 2 cents per bushel, while the 
charge for volume reduction is 1.3 percent per bushel.  The charge for this volume reduction is 
calculated as 1.3 percent times the average harvest-time cash price for each marketing year.  For 
example, for the 1997 crop the harvest-time cash price was $2.65 per bushel, so the charge for 
volume reduction was 3.4 cents per bushel ($2.65*1.3%). 
 
Market Benchmark 
Simply comparing the net price received across advisory services will not answer the 
question of whether advisory services as a group enhance the income of farm subscribers.  
Instead, a comparison to a benchmark price (or prices) is needed to evaluate the performance of 
advisory services relative to pricing opportunities offered by the market.  In the stock market,   11 
mutual funds are evaluated with respect to market benchmark performance criteria (e.g., Bodie, 
Kane, and Marcus, 1989).  These benchmarks typically are indexes of stock market returns over 
the period of evaluation, e.g., the Dow Jones Industrial Average and Standard and Poor’s 500. 
The selection of a benchmark for advisory service performance evaluations is examined 
in a recent report by Good, Irwin and Jackson (1998).  They argue that the most appropriate 
market benchmark is the average cash price for corn and soybeans over the entire marketing 
horizon.  The marketing window used in the AgMAS project for a given crop spans two calendar 
years, beginning on the first business day of September in the year prior to harvest, and extends 
through the last business day of August in the year after harvest.  Hence, the market benchmark 
is calculated as the average of the daily central-Illinois cash grain bids available for the two-year 
marketing window.  Pre-harvest cash prices represent cash-forward bids for harvest delivery in 
central-Illinois, while daily spot prices for central-Illinois are used for the post-harvest period. 
Two adjustments are made to the daily cash prices to make the average cash price 
benchmark consistent with the calculated net advisory prices for each marketing program.  First, 
instead of taking the simple average of the daily prices, a weighted average price is calculated to 
account for changing yield expectations.  The daily weighting factors for pre-harvest prices are 
based on the calculated trend yield, while the weighting of the post-harvest prices is based on the 
actual reported yield for central-Illinois.  The second adjustment to the daily cash prices is to 
adjust the post-harvest cash prices to a harvest equivalent by subtracting carrying charges.  The 
daily carrying charges are calculated in the same manner as those for the net advisory price. 
Complete details of the construction of this benchmark price can be found in Good, Irwin and 
Jackson (1998).   12 
In order to test the sensitivity of performance results to the choice of market benchmark,  
two alternative versions of the previous average cash price benchmark also are considered in the 
analysis.  The first alternative benchmark averages prices for the 20-month period starting in 
January of the year of harvest and ending in August of the year after harvest. The only difference 
between this alternative and the 24-month benchmark is the exclusion of the pre-harvest period 
previous to January.  Hence, this alternative benchmark places more weight on post-harvest 
prices than pre-harvest prices.  The second alternative benchmark averages prices only for a 12-
month marketing year, and includes only post-harvest prices in the averaging process.  
 
Statistical Tests of Market Advisory Service Pricing Performance 
Two statistical tests are used to test the null hypothesis that average market advisory 
service pricing performance does not differ from that of the market benchmark.  The first test is  
based on the proportion of services exceeding the benchmark price.
5 This test is considered 
because it is not influenced by extremely high or low advisory prices.  The second test is based 
on the average percentage difference (“return”) between the net price of services and the 
benchmark price.
6  This test is useful because it takes into account the average magnitude of 
differences from the benchmark.
7  Further details on the two statistical tests can be found in 
Irwin, Jackson and Good (1999). 
Table 1 reports results of the proportional test of corn pricing performance for each year 
and all three years pooled.  Statistical significance is based on a null hypothesis proportion of 
0.5, the same as the proportion of heads observed in the flips of a fair coin. Individual year 
results are quite sensitive to the benchmark considered.  For example, the proportion of services 
above the 24-month benchmark price in 1995 is 0.72 and statistically significant, while the   13 
proportion of services above the 12-month benchmark is only 0.08.  This latter proportion is also 
statistically significant, but in the opposite direction, indicating significantly inferior 
performance.  Despite the variation across benchmarks for individual years, the overall 
proportions for the three years are similar across the benchmarks, ranging only from 0.51 to 0.59.  
None of the three-year proportions are significantly different from 0.5 at the five- or ten-percent 
level, although the 12-month benchmark proportion is quite close to significance at the ten-
percent level.  
Table 2 shows the results of the proportional test of soybean pricing performance for each 
year and all three years pooled. Like corn, individual year results are sensitive to the benchmark 
considered.  The most dramatic contrast again can be found in 1995, where the proportion of 
services above the 24-month benchmark price is 0.84 and statistically significant, while the 
proportion of services above the 12-month benchmark is only 0.16.  The overall proportions for 
the three years range from 0.57 to 0.77.  Two of the three-year proportions (24-month and 20-
month benchmarks) are significantly greater than 0.5 at the one-percent level.  
Table 3 reports proportional test results for combined corn and soybean revenue.  The 
per-acre revenue for each commodity is found by multiplying the net advisory price for each 
market advisory program by the actual central-Illinois corn or soybean yield for each year.  A 
simple average of the two per acre revenues is then taken to reflect a farm that uses a 50/50 
rotation of corn and soybeans. As would be expected, the proportions for revenue per acre fall 
between the proportions for corn and soybean net advisory prices and show a similar pattern of 
variation across the alternative benchmarks in a given year.  Combined corn and soybean 
performance for the entire three-year period is less variable across the benchmarks, with the   14 
proportion of programs above the benchmark ranging only from 0.60 to 0.64.  It is noteworthy 
that the three-year proportions are significantly above 0.5 for all three benchmarks. 
   Results for the average return test of pricing performance are reported in Tables 4, 5 and 
6.  Individual year and three-year average test results for corn, shown in Table 4, are 
qualitatively the same as the proportional test results. Point estimates of the three-year average 
returns range from –0.34 to 0.74 percent.  However, none of the three-year average corn returns 
are significantly different from zero.  Individual year and three-year average results for soybeans, 
reported in Table 5, are qualitatively similar to the proportional test results.  The only differences 
occur in 1997 for the 24-month and 20-month benchmarks, where significance is detected for 
average soybean returns but not the proportion of services above the market.  Point estimates of 
the three-year average soybean returns range from 0.71 to 3.00 percent, substantially higher than 
for corn.  Two of the three-year average soybean returns are significantly different from zero 
(24-month and 20-month benchmarks).  Results of the average return test for combined corn and 
soybean revenue, found in Table 6, differ the most from proportional test results.  Three-year 
average revenue returns are significant only for the 24-month benchmark, whereas three-year 
proportions are significant for all three benchmarks.  This divergence in results appears to be due 
to large, negative returns in some years (e.g. 1995, 12-month average benchmark) and relatively 
higher variation in returns as compared to proportions.  Point estimates of the three-year average 
revenue returns range from -0.30 to 1.84 percent, which, as expected, is between the ranges for 
corn and soybeans.   
  In statistical terms, the pricing performance test results presented in this section are fairly 
clear.  Little or no evidence is found regarding the ability of market advisory services to 
consistently and significantly “beat the market” for corn.  There is substantial evidence that   15 
market advisory services consistently and significantly “beat the market” in soybeans.  When 
corn and soybean net advisory prices are combined into revenue per acre, some evidence also is 
found that market advisory services significantly outperform the market.  Tests results for 
revenue are the most sensitive to the type of test and benchmark considered.  Overall, the 
statistical results suggest that market advisory services have some ability to outperform broad 
market benchmarks.  
Given the statistical results summarized above, a relevant question to ask is whether the 
pricing performance of advisory services also is economically significant.  While "economic 
significance" is a vague concept, it is important nonetheless.  Perhaps the best perspective on this 
question is gained by re-examining returns for corn and soybean revenue per acre.  Given the 
sensitivity of measured returns to the benchmark considered, the best point estimate of revenue 
returns probably is the simple average across the three benchmarks.  This “grand average” 
revenue return across all three marketing years is 0.74 percent, which translates into about $3 per 
acre above benchmark revenue.
8  While this level of return is probably best characterized as 
“small,” it also appears to be non-trivial, particularly in comparison to the cost of the services.  
Jackson, Irwin and Good (1999) report that the average cost of the services is $279 per year.  For 
a 1,000 acre corn and soybean farm, this translates into an average cost of only 28 cents per acre.  
There are two important reasons to be cautious about concluding that advisory returns generate 
even a "small" level of economic significance: i) the results are based on a limited sample of 
years, and ii) returns are concentrated in only one market, soybeans. 
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Predictability of Advisory Service Performance 
  Even if, as a group, advisory services generate positive returns, there is a wide range in 
performance for any given year.  For example, soybean net advisory prices for 1995 vary from 
$5.71 per bushel to $7.94 per bushel.  While this example is the most dramatic, the variation 
across advisors in other cases also is substantial.  This raises the important question of the 
predictability of advisory service performance from year-to-year.  In other words, is past 
performance indicative of future results?  This issue is addressed by calculating correlation 
coefficients for measures of advisory service performance across adjacent marketing years. The 
testing procedures have been widely applied in studies of financial investment performance 
(Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler, 1987; Irwin, Zulauf and Ward, 1994; Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992).  Recent analysis by Brorsen and Townsend (1998) indicates these methods are 
reasonably powerful in detecting performance persistence if it exists. 
  The first step in predictability analysis is to rank each advisory service based on net price 
received. Then the services are sorted in descending order.  For example, the service with the 
highest net advisory price is ranked number one, and the service with the lowest net advisory 
price is assigned a number equal to the total number of observations for that commodity in the 
given year.  Finally, the correlation coefficient is computed between the sorted performance 
measures for two adjacent marketing years.  A significant correlation indicates predictability in 
returns across years.   
Estimated correlation coefficients and tests of significance are presented in Table 7.
9, 10  
For corn, a significant and moderately positive correlation is found in the net advisory price and 
the percentage return above the 24-month benchmark between the 1995 and 1996 marketing 
years.  A positive correlation also is found between the rank of the services in corn between 1995   17 
and 1996, but it is not statistically significant.  Nominally, just the opposite situation occurs for 
the 1996 and 1997 marketing years, where negative correlations are found for all three 
performance measures.  The net result is a small average correlation coefficient across the two 
pairs of years, about 0.10.  Hence, there does not appear to be consistent pricing performance 
across time in corn for individual advisory services. 
Little evidence of predictability is found for soybeans.  All of the estimated correlation 
coefficients are positive, but only one is significantly different from zero (rank correlation, 1995 
vs. 1996).  When averaged across the two pairs of marketing years, the correlation is only about 
0.20.  Predictability results for revenue are similar to those found for corn and soybeans.  
Overall, there does not appear to be evidence of persistence in the pricing performance of market 
advisory services. 
 
Marketing Behavior of Advisory Services 
   Pricing performance, as investigated in the previous two sections, is critical to 
understanding the grain marketing performance farmers may expect from advisory services. 
However, pricing performance is not likely to be the only relevant criterion. For example, two 
advisory services may generate similar net price results in a given marketing year, but the paths 
to that result might differ significantly along several dimensions, including: i) type of 
recommended pricing tool (cash, futures, options, etc.), ii) timing of sales, and iii) frequency of 
transactions. 
Specific examples help illustrate the range of approaches that advisory services may 
employ.  One service may make use of "selective" hedging strategies, while another may use 
only "conventional" hedging strategies and cash sales.  Some services may recommend selling   18 
(writing) options, while others only recommend buying options.  Storage may or may not be 
recommended. Additionally, a particular service may use a strategy involving only a few pricing 
decisions, but in large quantities, while a competitor uses numerous pricing decisions in smaller 
quantities.   
It is well known that farmers differ in their approach to marketing (e.g., Goodwin and 
Schroeder, 1994; Goodwin and Kastens, 1996; Patrick, Musser, and Eckman, 1998).  As a result, 
differences in the marketing approach of advisory services should influence a farmer’s choice of  
services.  However, there is no previous research on the marketing behavior of different advisory 
services. 
A daily index of the net amount sold for a representative set of market advisory programs 
is used to illustrate different categories of market advisory service behavior. To construct such an 
index, the various futures, options, and cash positions recommended for a program on a given 
day must be weighted in some manner.  Fortunately, the price exposure of a portfolio of 
positions is a weighted-average of the price exposures of the individual positions, where the 
weights are the “deltas" of the individual positions (Hull, 1997).  The definition of delta is the 
dollar amount that the value of a position changes for a one dollar increase in the price of the 
underlying commodity.
11  Hence, a long futures position has a delta of +1, as a one dollar per 
bushel increase in the price of the futures results in one dollar per bushel increase in the value of 
the position.  Complete details of the procedure used to construct the delta-weighted index values 
can be found in Bertoli, Zulauf, Irwin, Jackson and Good (1999). 
  When daily values of the index are plotted for the entire marketing window, the 
marketing "profile" for a program is generated. Marketing profiles are computed for all of the 
advisory programs included in the pricing performance analysis.  Since there are 174 profiles in   19 
total (one for each program per commodity per year) it is not reasonable to present all profiles!  
Instead, marketing profiles for 1995-1998 are presented for three programs in corn that broadly 
represent the range of marketing behavior of advisory services.  These marketing profiles are 
presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3.  The scale for the net amount sold varies from -80 percent to 
+120 percent.  A negative percent sold represents a net long “hedging” position, +100 percent 
net sold means that the entire crop has been sold in some form, and above +100 percent 
represents “over-hedging.”  
   Corn marketing profiles for the Pro Farmer Cash Program (Figure 1) are representative of 
a traditional “scale-up” approach to marketing, where relatively small increments of the crop are 
sold at fairly regular time intervals.  There is a strong consistency in the market approach across 
the three years in this case.  Corn marketing profiles for the Brock Hedge Program (Figure 2) are 
representative of a “selective hedging” approach to marketing.  Here, short futures or options 
hedges are placed when prices are expected to decrease and lifted when prices are expected to 
increase.  This may be done quite frequently, as is evident in the marketing profiles for each 
year. Corn marketing profiles for the Ag Resource Program (Figure 3) are representative of a 
“speculative” approach to marketing, where net long positions are taken and large swings in the 
net amount sold may be observed.   The marketing behavior observed in 1995 is the most 
dramatic:  a net long position was held for almost a year-and-a-half and then the entire crop was 
sold over about a two-week period. 
  Further details regarding the marketing profiles for the three advisory programs are 
presented in Table 8.  The dates of the first and last marketing transaction show that there is 
considerable variation in the “location” of marketing windows across years for a given program 
or across programs for a given year.  For example, Pro Farmer Cash began marketing the 1997   20 
corn crop in March 1997, while Ag Resource began almost a year earlier, in May 1996.  It is not 
surprising then that the length of the marketing window varied substantially as well.  Marketing 
windows for all three programs averaged more than a year in length (more than 365 calendar 
days).  The shortest window was only 304 days and the longest was 828 days. 
   Another indicator of marketing behavior is the number of transactions (cash, forward, 
futures and options).  Two observations can be made based on this indicator.  First, there are 
clear differences in trading behavior across the programs.  Pro Farmer Cash makes relatively 
infrequent transactions, while Brock Hedge makes many transactions.  Second, the number of 
transactions per crop year for each advisory program is relatively consistent.  The number of 
transactions per year for Pro Farmer Cash varies only from five to eight.    The number of 
transactions per year for Brock Hedge ranges from 31 to 38.  There is somewhat more variation 
in the number of transactions per year for Ag Resource, with a low of 13 and a high of 23. 
  The final two indicators presented in Table 8 are the amount of the crop sold on May 1
st 
(planting) and October 1
st (harvest).  In the case of Pro Farmer Cash, generally no more than 
one-third of a crop is sold before planting or harvesting.  Just the opposite pattern is observed for 
Brock Hedge, where about three-quarters of the crop typically is sold by planting time.  There is 
no consistent pattern in the case of Ag Resource.  Relatively large net long or net short positions 
can be observed at both planting and harvest time. 
  The picture that emerges from this discussion of marketing profiles is one of clearly 
identifiable marketing “styles.”  The examples suggest that advisory services develop an 
approach to marketing and consistently follow that approach across crop years.  In addition, the 
approach to marketing, or “style,” may differ markedly across services. This provides farmers 
with a wide-variety of marketing approaches to choose from.     21 
Summary 
Market advisory services represent an important source of private-sector grain marketing 
information and advice for farmers.  Given the important role that market advisory services play 
in grain marketing and risk management, it is somewhat surprising that only two previous 
academic studies investigate the performance of advisory services (Gehrt and Good, 1993; 
Martines-Filho, 1996).  The lack of studies is most likely due to the difficulty in obtaining data 
on the stream of recommendations provided by services.  
In 1994, the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project was initiated, with 
the goal of providing unbiased and rigorous evaluation of market advisory services for farmers.  
Since its inception, the AgMAS Project has collected marketing recommendations for about 25 
market advisory programs.  The AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are 
followed, and as a result, "real-time" recommendations are obtained.  This prevents the data from 
being subject to survivorship and hindsight biases.   
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing performance and behavior of 
market advisory services in corn and soybeans.  Market advisory service recommendations for 
corn and soybeans are available from the AgMAS Project for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 marketing 
years.  At least 21 advisory services are included for each commodity and marketing year. While 
the sample of advisory services is non-random, it is constructed to be generally representative of 
the majority of advisory services available to farmers.   
Tests of pricing performance relative to a market benchmark are based on the proportion 
of services exceeding the benchmark price and the average percentage difference between the net 
price of services and the benchmark price.  In statistical terms, the pricing performance test 
results provide little evidence that market advisory services consistently and significantly “beat   22 
the market” in corn.  There is substantial evidence that market advisory services consistently and 
significantly “beat the market” in soybeans.  When corn and soybean net advisory prices are 
combined into revenue per acre, some evidence also is found that market advisory services 
significantly outperform the market.  Tests results for revenue are the most sensitive to the type 
of test and benchmark considered.  Overall, the statistical results suggest that market advisory 
services have some ability to outperform broad market benchmarks.  
It is debatable whether the performance of advisory services also is economically 
significant. Perhaps the best perspective on this question is gained by examining returns for corn 
and soybean revenue per acre.  For all three marketing years, returns averaged 0.74 percent 
above benchmark revenue, which translates into about $3 per acre.  While this level of return is 
probably best characterized as “small,” it also appears to be non-trivial, particularly in 
comparison to the cost of the services.  However, there are two important reasons to be cautious 
about concluding that advisory returns generate even a "small" level of economic significance: i) 
the results are based on a small sample of years, and ii) returns are concentrated in only one 
market, soybeans.  
Tests of predictability are based on the year-to-year correlation of advisory service ranks, 
prices and percentage differences from the benchmark.  In general, the predictability results 
provide little evidence that advisory service pricing performance can be predicted from year-to-
year.  The average correlation coefficient relating performance from one year to the next is only 
about 0.10 to 0.20.   
A daily index of the net amount sold for market advisory programs is used to illustrate 
different categories of market advisory service behavior. To construct such an index, the various 
futures, options, and cash positions recommended for a program on a given day are weighted by   23 
position “deltas.”  When daily values of the index are plotted for the entire marketing window, 
the marketing "profile" for a program is generated.  The picture that emerges from the marketing 
profiles is that of three clearly identifiable marketing “styles”:  i) “scale-up” sales, ii) selective 
hedging and iii) “speculative” hedging.  Advisory services tend to follow the same approach 
across crop years.   
In sum, the results of this study suggest that market advisory services exhibit some ability 
to "beat the market" for corn and soybean crops.  In addition, market advisory services provide 
farmers with a wide-variety of choices regarding marketing approaches.  Some are consistent 
with traditional academic concepts of risk management, while others are highly speculative.  If 
the private-sector is to play a more important role in grain marketing and risk management in the 
future, more research and education is needed to help farmers match their marketing preferences 
to the marketing approaches used by private firms. 
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Table 1.  Number of Advisory Service Programs above Alternative Market Benchmark 
Prices, Corn, 1995 -1997 
                   
   Number  Proportion        
  Number of  of Programs  of Programs       
Market Benchmark/  Advisory  above  above    Two-tail   
Sample Period  Programs  Benchmark  Benchmark  Z-statistic  p-value    
            
24-Month Average             
1995  25 18 0.72  2.20  0.028 ** 
1996  26 10 0.38  -1.18  0.239  
1997  23 10 0.43  -0.63  0.532  
1995-1997  74 38 0.51  0.23  0.816  
           
20-Month Average            
1995  25 13 0.52  0.20  0.841  
1996  26 10 0.38  -1.18  0.239  
1997  23 15 0.65  1.46  0.144  
1995-1997  74 38 0.51  0.23  0.816  
           
12-Month Average            
1995 25  2  0.08  -4.20  0.000 *** 
1996  26 23 0.88  3.92  0.000 *** 
1997  23 19 0.83  3.13  0.002 *** 
1995-1997  74 44 0.59  1.63  0.104    
           
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 
5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.     27 
 
Table 2.  Number of Advisory Service Programs above Alternative Market Benchmark 
Prices, Soybeans, 1995 -1997 
                   
   Number  Proportion        
  Number of of Programs of Programs       
Market Benchmark/  Advisory  above  above    Two-tail   
Sample Period  Programs  Benchmark  Benchmark  Z-statistic  p-value    
            
24-Month  Average           
1995 25  21  0.84  3.40  0.001  *** 
1996 24  20  0.83  3.27  0.001  *** 
1997 21  13  0.62  1.09  0.275   
1995-1997 70 54 0.77  4.54  0.000  *** 
            
20-Month Average            
1995 25  18  0.72  2.20  0.028  ** 
1996 24  14  0.58  0.82  0.414   
1997 21  14  0.67  1.53  0.127   
1995-1997 70 46 0.66  2.63  0.009  *** 
            
12-Month Average            
1995 25  4  0.16  -3.40  0.001  *** 
1996 24  15  0.63  1.22  0.221   
1997 21  21  1.00  4.58  0.000  *** 
1995-1997 70 40 0.57  1.20  0.232     
          
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 
5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 3.  Number of Advisory Service Programs above Alternative Market Benchmark 
Revenues, 1995 -1997 
                   
   Number  Proportion       
  Number of  of Programs  of Programs       
Market Benchmark/  Advisory  above  above    Two-tail   
Sample Period  Programs  Benchmark  Benchmark  Z-statistic  p-value    
            
24-Month  Average           
1995 25  19  0.76  2.60  0.009 *** 
1996 24  15  0.63  1.22  0.221  
1997 21  11  0.52  0.22  0.827  
1995-1997 70  45  0.64  2.39  0.017 ** 
           
20-Month Average            
1995 25  15  0.60  1.00  0.317  
1996 24  13  0.54  0.41  0.683  
1997 21  15  0.71  1.96  0.050 ** 
1995-1997 70  43  0.61  1.91  0.056 * 
           
12-Month Average            
1995 25  2  0.08  -4.20  0.000 *** 
1996 24  20  0.83  3.27  0.001 *** 
1997 21  20  0.95  4.15  0.000 *** 
1995-1997 70  42  0.60  1.67  0.094 * 
           
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 
5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 4.  Average Returns above Alternative Market Benchmark Prices for Advisory 
Service Programs, Corn, 1995 - 1997 
                   
   Average           
  Number of  Return above         
Market Benchmark/  Advisory  Benchmark  Standard    Two-tail  
Sample Period  Programs  Price  Deviation  t-statistic  p-value  
      (%)  (%)          
          
24-Month Average             
1995 25  3.97  11.10  1.79  0.086 * 
1996 26  -1.23  8.49  -0.74  0.466  
1997 23  -0.54  7.83  -0.33  0.745  
1995-1997 74  0.74  9.44  0.68  0.501  
20-Month Average            
1995 25  -1.73  11.10  -0.78  0.445  
1996 26  -1.61  8.49  -0.97  0.343  
1997 23  2.07  7.83  1.27  0.218  
1995-1997 74  -0.51  9.31  -0.47  0.642  
12-Month Average             
1995 25  -17.37  11.10  -7.83  0.000 *** 
1996 26  8.26  8.49  4.96  0.000 *** 
1997 23  8.44  7.83  5.17  0.000 *** 
1995-1997 74  -0.34  15.29  -0.19  0.850    
           
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 
5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 5.  Average Returns above Alternative Market Benchmark Prices for Advisory 
Service Programs, Soybeans, 1995 - 1997 
                   
   Average           
  Number of  Return above         
Market Benchmark/  Advisory  Benchmark  Standard    Two-tail  
Sample Period  Programs  Price  Deviation  t-statistic  p-value  
      (%)  (%)          
            
24-Month Average             
1995 25  5.03  6.12  4.11  0.000 *** 
1996 24  2.15  3.14  3.35  0.003 *** 
1997 21  1.54  4.01  1.76  0.094 * 
1995-1997 70  3.00  4.84  5.18  0.000 *** 
           
20-Month Average            
1995 25  2.97  6.12  2.43  0.023 ** 
1996 24  0.75  3.14  1.17  0.253  
1997 21  2.82  4.01  3.22  0.004 *** 
1995-1997 70  2.17  4.70  3.86  0.000 *** 
           
12-Month Average             
1995 25  -4.13  6.12  -3.37  0.003 *** 
1996 24  1.03  3.14  1.61  0.122  
1997 21  6.09  4.01  6.95  0.000 *** 
1995-1997 70  0.71  6.19  0.955  0.343    
           
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 
5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 6.  Average Returns above Alternative Market Benchmark Revenues for Advisory 
Service Programs, Corn and Soybeans, 1995 - 1997 
                   
   Average           
  Number of  Return above         
Market Benchmark/  Advisory  Benchmark  Standard    Two-tail  
Sample Period  Programs  Revenue  Deviation  t-statistic  p-value  
      (%)  (%)          
            
24-Month Average             
1995 25  4.51  8.33  2.71  0.012 ** 
1996 24  0.26  5.21  0.24  0.810  
1997 21  0.47  5.49  0.40  0.696  
1995-1997 70  1.84  6.78  2.27  0.026 ** 
           
20-Month Average            
1995 25  0.37  8.33  0.22  0.826  
1996 24  -0.57  5.21  -0.53  0.598  
1997 21  2.45  5.49  2.05  0.054 * 
1995-1997 70  0.67  6.59  0.85  0.396  
           
12-Month Average            
1995 25  -11.75  8.33  -7.05  0.000 *** 
1996 24  4.94  5.21  4.64  0.000 *** 
1997 21  7.33  5.49  6.12  0.000 *** 
1995-1997 70  -0.30  10.80  -0.24  0.815    
           
Note:  Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance at the 
5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Table 7.  Correlation of Advisory Service Performance Between Pairs of 
Marketing Years, 1995-1997 
                
Commodity/         
Correlation Measure  1995 vs. 1996     1996 vs. 1997     Average 
         
Corn         
     Rank Correlation  0.29  -0.06  0.12 
 [0.190]  [0.795]   
        
     Net Price Correlation  0.52 ** -0.28  0.12 
 [0.013]  [0.206]   
        
     Return Correlation  0.52 ** -0.27  0.12 
 [0.014]  [0.219]   
         
Soybeans         
     Rank Correlation  0.36 * 0.01  0.19 
 [0.097]  [0.953]   
        
     Net Price Correlation  0.25  0.17  0.21 
 [0.269]  [0.498]   
        
     Return Correlation  0.26  0.17  0.22 
 [0.237]  [0.487]   
        
Revenue         
     Rank Correlation  0.35 ** -0.05  0.15 
 [0.024]  [0.240]   
        
     Revenue Correlation  0.48  -0.27  0.11 
 [0.111]  [0.845]   
        
     Return Correlation  0.48 ** -0.26  0.11 
   [0.023]    [0.263]      
Note: Three stars indicates significance at the 1% level, two stars indicates significance 
at the 5% level, and one star indicates significance at the 10% level.   Return 
correlations are based on the 24-month average cash price benchmark. Figures in 
brackets are two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 8.  Selected Indicators of Advisory Program Marketing Behavior, Corn, 1995-1997 
           
   Date of  Date of   Length of     Amount Sold  Amount Sold 
Advisory Program/  First  Final  Active Marketing  Number of   May 1 of Crop  October 1 of  
Crop Year  Transaction  Transaction  Period (days)  Transactions  Year (%)  Crop Year (%) 
           
Pro Farmer Cash             
1995 5/9/95  4/30/96  351  5  0  29 
1996 1/11/96  8/7/97 566  8  25  45 
1997 4/4/97  8/3/98  479  7  10  25 
Average     465  7 12  33 
            
Brock  Hedge           
1995 1/13/95  11/17/95  304  31  71  58 
1996 7/31/95  12/10/96  490  31  80  71 
1997 2/27/97  3/12/98  375  38  86  94 
Average     390  33 79  75 
            
Ag Resource             
1995 1/23/95  3/28/96  425  13  -35  -22 
1996 3/29/96  6/23/97  444  19  35  84 
1997 5/13/96  8/31/98  828  23  80  -42 
Average        566  18  27  7 
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  Figure 1.  Corn Marketing Profiles for the Pro Farmer Cash Program.   
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  Figure 2.  Corn Marketing Profiles for the Brock Hedge Program.     36 
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  Figure 3.  Corn Marketing Profiles for the Ag Resource Program.     37 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1  When the AgMAS study began in 1994, DTN and FarmDayta were separate companies.  The two companies 
merged in 1996.   
 
2 This assumption subsequently is relaxed to reflect the growing importance of alternative means of electronic 
delivery of market advisory services.  Beginning in 1997, a service that meets the original two criteria and is 
available on a "real-time" basis electronically may be included in the sample.   
 
3 Some of the programs that are depicted as “cash-only” do in fact have some futures-related activity, due to the use 
of hedge-to-arrive contracts, basis contracts, and some use of options. 
 
4 There are a few instances where a service clearly differentiates strategies based on the availability of on-farm 
versus off-farm (commercial) storage.  In these instances, recorded recommendations reflect the off-farm storage 
strategy.   Otherwise, services do not differentiate strategies according to the availability of on-farm storage. 
 
5 The test statistic is  (0 . 5 ) 0 . 2 5 / Zp n =− , where  p is the sample estimate of the proportion and n is the number 
of sample observations.  The sampling distribution of Z is standard normal. 
 








= ∑ , 
ln( / ) 100 ii r NAP BP =⋅ , NAPi is the net advisory price for the i
th advisory service and BP is the market benchmark 
price for the same commodity and marketing year, and  ˆ σ  is the estimated standard deviation of the differences 
across the n advisory services in the sample.  The t-statistic follows a t-distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom.   
 
7 An important issue is whether the sample observations on net advisory price are independent, both within and 
across years.  The most likely form of dependence is positive correlation, which, if ignored, would cause sample 
standard deviation estimates across advisory services to be understated.  This in turn would cause the statistical 
significance of hypothesis test results to be overstated.  Several possible forms of dependence are tested and 
rejected.  See Irwin, Jackson and Good (1999).   
 
8 This calculation ignores economies of size that may accrue to larger farms implementing the recommendations.  It 
also ignores contract "lumpiness" problems that may be significant for smaller farms. 
 
9  Return correlations also are calculated for corn, soybeans and revenue using 20-month and 12-month benchmarks.  
Results are similar to the 24-month benchmark return correlations and are not presented due to space considerations. 
 
10 Bartlett’s approximation for the standard error (1 n ) of the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is employed.  The 
test statistic Zrn = approximately follows a standard, normal distribution. 
 
11 The price increase may be any amount.  But, it is worth noting that, strictly speaking, a delta is only valid for 
"small" price changes in the vicinity of the current price. 
 